Debate Over the Relationship Between Climate Change and Security

Two articles recently posted on the AlertNet Climate Conversations blog have highlighted a new framework for debating the issue of climate change. That it is a critically important issue is accepted, yet argument is now focused on the degree to which climate change is not only designated a key driver of conflict, but to what extent climate change and its impact should be defined through a security lens at all. Katie Harris of the Overseas Development Institute suggests that while the security narrative of climate change may have caught the attention of the political and security classes, it has the dangerous potential to undermine both the theoretical understanding of the complex factors underlying conflict, and any practical attempts to promote cooperation over resources in conflict-sensitive regions such as the Levant.

Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell from the Center for Climate and Security broadly agree with Harris’ call for a nuanced approach to climate change and conflict, but take issue with the concept of a ‘climate-security narrative’ that interferes with specific cases of conflict-analysis. Rather than overwhelming this analysis, Femia and Werrell defend not only the sophistication of recent research into the relationship between climate change and conflict, but also its emphasis on the role of climate change as one conflict variable among many.

 

Climate Conversations - Climate-security as agent provocateur
By Katie Harris | February 18 2012

I want to take you back to 2007. Margaret Beckett was UK Foreign Secretary and chairing a United Nations Security Council debate. Instigated by the UK, this was the first Security Council debate to link security to climate change.

In the five years since Beckett stood before the Security Council, the topic of “climate-security” has been bounded around in all manner of debates.  It has been seized by government agencies, thinktanks, NGOs and the media. For some it is a “quick and dirty” way to grab the attention of those who are not normally interested in climate change, those who see it as a distant concern, of no concern of theirs, or simply a barrier to economic growth.

In many ways, framing climate change as a security issue has helped to raise awareness of its critical importance. It may even have contributed to increased policy traction.

But it is a dangerous tactic to gain popular attention. First, for those who want to identify the possible connections between a changing climate and the potential for increased violent conflict, nuance is key (as un-sexy as that may be). Second, it is unwise to promote such a narrative, given the role of perceptions in conflict. It is not, as conflict and security folk would say, “conflict sensitive”.

Take the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territory) as an example. Evidence shows that perceptions matter. As an International Institute for Sustainable Development report argues, “in the context of continuing distrust and political tension it is possible to imagine that allocations of resources could become increasingly tense. Control over them may become perceived as an increasingly key dimension of national security, and resource scarcity could be a pretext for their greater militarisation”.

Using a play on words, Betsy Hartmann has coined the phrase “operation enduring narrative” to reflect the continued presence of the climate-security debate. Indeed, climate-security is being taken up by the UK Foreign Secretary William Hague as well as the UK’s Ministry of Defence.

I want to stress that we must take seriously the challenges that climate change may present for security, the sharing of scarce natural resources and possible impacts on patterns of migration and food security. That said, I’m arguing that we need a more cautious approach to how we understand the role of climate change in such dynamics, and more caution in how we treat the issue overseas.

In many parts of the world that have had the “climate-security” spotlight shone on them, climate change is unlikely to be the biggest thing affecting their immediate security. I’m referring specifically to those places currently experiencing violent conflict.

So yes, it is important to recognise the need to act now on climate change, but we must do so in a way that helps us get a better handle on how we can support communities that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and conflict in ways that are positive, proactive and meaningful. As with many  other factors affecting peace and security, good governance is required to create the right institutional environment to handle tensions and conflict in peaceful ways.

WATER SUCCESSES

The water sector, for example, has led the way in showing how, with the right support, contested water sources can foster peace through cross-border cooperation. The Good Water Neighbors project is one such example.

Working with 25 neighbouring communities from Israel, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territory, the project has turned wise use of water into an entry point to promote cooperation, create trust, increase willingness to cooperate and change attitudes. While long-term sustainable change requires the support of wider governance and political systems, this has been at least a first step at the local level.

The climate-security narrative continues to be pushed forward in 2012, without enough focus on the opportunities for collaboration, cooperation and negotiation that are vital to avoid the very doomsday scenarios that are being promoted.

Yet, as my recent ODI report shows, it is welcome news that the UK government is maintaining its focus on the need to promote good governance, address the underlying causes of conflict and support communities at risk of climate change and conflict through the Department for International Development (DFID).

To date, DFID funds for climate change are being delivered through the usual array of development channels, rather than being diverted to those more commonly associated with security and military interventions. Whether this will continue depends on how the climate-security narrative plays out this year – and the influence of new dialogue around issues from everything from the role of climate change in the Arab Spring to Arctic security.

Katie Harris works on conflict and climate change issues for the London-based Overseas Development Institute.

To read the original article, click here

To read Katie Hariss' ODI blog on climate change and security policy, click here

 

Climate Conversations - Climate-security a reality, not a narrative
By Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell | February 21 2012

AlertNet posted an interesting piece recently titled “Climate-security as agent provocateur.” The author, Katie Harris of the London-based Overseas Development Institute, rightly calls for “nuance” in making the case for the potential security and conflict implications of climate change.

The essence of the article is that though the “frame” or “narrative” of climate-security may have generated increased interest and action from the world’s policy-makers, it can be dangerous if done poorly. We couldn’t agree more.

Also, as Harris states, “for those who want to identify the possible connections between a changing climate and the potential for increased violent conflict, nuance is key…” Indeed it is!

However, despite these wise words of caution, the article omits a couple key points that may address some of the author’s concerns, including the significant evolution of climate and security scholarship in recent years, and how climate-security is actually defined in this space, specifically in relation to conflict.

First, the climate and security discourse is evolving. More and more is being done to tease out the connections between climate change, security and conflict as additional regional and local climate data become available.

There are too many reports to list here, but a number of recent studies from Busby et al., Hsiang et al., Mabey et al.,  Werz & Conley, and an entire special issue from the Journal of Peace Research, come to mind. In this work, “the security implications of climate change” is no mere frame, but a well-analyzed reality and probability, which factors in a number of specific human variables, in particular conflict-ridden and conflict-prone regions of the world, such as the Sahel and Central Asia.

While more needs to be done to better incorporate non-environmental variables into such assessments (such as the numerous locale-specific social, political and economic drivers of conflict), the field has come a long way since the phrase “climate change is a security threat” was uttered late last century.

Second, the article repeats a common misconception about the climate-security discourse which we would be remiss to not address (and which we discussed in a previous blog response to an AlertNet piece). Harris states:

In many parts of the world that have had the ‘climate-security’ spotlight shone on them, climate change is unlikely to be the biggest thing affecting their immediate security. I’m referring specifically to those places currently experiencing violent conflict.

This is a perfectly reasonable statement. However, the serious scholars and practitioners in the climate-security sphere rarely, if ever, refer to climate change as “the biggest thing affecting the immediate security” of people in countries experiencing, or likely to experience, conflict.

A ‘THREAT MULTIPLIER’

In most cases, climate change is treated as one serious variable among many, often defined as a “threat multliplier” or “accelerant of instability.” In other words, the discourse is indeed sensitive to the other drivers of conflict, despite Harris’ assertion that climate-security is not “conflict sensitive.”

Among those who are serious about exploring the connections, climate change is a phenomenon that in many cases may exacerbate the current tensions that lead to conflict, whether it is resource scarcity, economic disparity, population mobility, or poor governance. Climate change is not an independent variable looming out there on its own (a recent panel discussion hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars fleshes out this concept brilliantly).

In this context, the assertion that climate change may be a security risk is not an alarmist tactic, by any means. It is the exploration of a very probable reality. And fully exploring this risk is a necessary prerequisite for developing solutions. As Harris states:

The climate-security narrative continues to be pushed forward in 2012, without enough focus on the opportunities for collaboration, cooperation and negotiation that are vital to avoid the very doomsday scenarios that are being promoted.

Once again, agreed. But in order to focus on opportunities for cooperation, it is important to fully flesh out the climate-security risks that such cooperation must address in order to avoid these so-called “doomsday scenarios.” Continued research on the climate-security nexus, more work on further incorporating the non-environmental drivers of conflict into climate-security studies, and a continued promotion of the excellent work that has already been done, will be key for devising the smart and “conflict sensitive” solutions that Harris is calling for.

Nuance is, indeed, key.

In short, we should not let the occasionally irresponsible use of the climate-security “frame” discredit the responsible scholarship addressing the climate-security “reality.” Harris’ article should be seen as a call to do more in this space, not less.

Francesco Femia and Caitlin E. Werrell are founding directors of the Center for Climate and Security. This blog first appeared on the center website.

To read the original article, click here