Before the Cyberwar

Those concerned with the issue of militarisation as a driver of global insecurity are increasingly looking at the issue of cyberwarfare as the weapons of war become ever closely associated with the digital age. Waging war in the cyber domain raises some truly momentous questions about the nature of warfare, the laws of war and even what counts as self-defence. Nuclear expert, Scott Kemp has written an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists arguing that like the missed opportunity of the dawn of the nuclear age (in which possessing nuclear weapons was viewed as more important than the consequences of proliferation), policymakers today have an important opportunity to consider the implications - both intended and unintended - of cyberweapons.

The article argues that in the early 1940s “The United States rushed into the nuclear age eager to cement its technical superiority, disregarding warnings of key statesmen and scientists that a decades-long nuclear arms race would ensue.” Kemp believes that we currently stand on the edge of a similar military revolution to the beginning of the nuclear age and that it is not too late to think carefully about the long-term consequences of creating a new “weapon of the weak.”

Looking to the future, Kemp argues that “For states that have little to lose on the cyber front, an offensive approach may be interesting. But for the United States and other highly developed nations whose societies are critically and deeply reliant on computers, the safe approach is to direct cyber research at purely defensive applications.” Unlike the wrong-headed approach to nuclear weapons (in which a small clique of countries believed that they could develop a huge military advantage without opening a Pandora’s Box of imitation and proliferation of that same technology), the article argues for a much more strategic and far-sighted approach to the development of cyberwarfare capabilities.

Such an approach would be based on an understanding of one of the central problems of world politics – known in the scholarly literature as the ‘security dilemma’ – in which arming oneself in order to defend against potential threats makes others feel threatened, who then in turn respond by arming themselves, thus starting a downward spiral of insecurity. Actions aimed at making yourself more secure today can in fact make you less secure tomorrow. As Kemp writes “Though Israel and the United States may have vast resources to support sophisticated and creative cyberweapons programs, it is worth remembering that such advantage could be its disadvantage: Each new cyberattack becomes a template for other nations – or sub-national actors – looking for ideas.”

The article is a rare piece of rational and honest analysis in an area that is fast moving up the lists of national defence priorities in countries around the world. If Kemp is right and we are at an “Acheson and Lilienthal moment of the digital age”, then such clear-headed and strategic thinking about this new domain of warfare is going to need a great deal of support.

The full article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists can be accessed here.

Image source: WFB